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Bankruptcy’s  Rarity:  An  Essay  on    
Small  Business  Bankruptcy  in  the  United  States  
  
Edward  R.  Morrison†  
  
I.  Introduction  
Few   failing   businesses   in   the   United   States   invoke   the   Federal   Bankruptcy  
Code  to  reorganize  or  liquidate.  For  every  one  hundred  small  businesses  that  fail,  at  
most  20  file  a  petition  under  the  federal  bankruptcy  law.  What  explains  the  rarity  of  
bankruptcy  filings   in  the  United  States?  Are  they  rare  because,   for  most  firms,   less  
expensive  alternatives  are  available  under  state  law?  If  so,  what  makes  these  alterna-­‐‑
tives  less  expensive  to  some  firms  and  not  others?  What  features  of  state  law,  federal  
law,  and  a  firm’s  capital  structure  make  the  U.S.  Bankruptcy  Code  a  law  of  last  re-­‐‑
sort  for  most  failing  firms?  
I  explore  these  questions  in  this  short  essay.  They  have  been  the  focus  of  my  
work,  and  the  work  of  colleagues,  during  the  past  few  years.1  The  questions  are  rel-­‐‑
evant  to  an  international  symposium  such  as  this  because  they  highlight  a  dynamic  
present  in  any  legal  system  that  regulates  insolvency.  In  every  nation,  failing  firms  
have   options.  One   is   a   proceeding   under   national   insolvency   laws.  Another   is   an  
agreement  or  “workout”  among  creditors.  Another  may  be  the  law  of  secured  trans-­‐‑
actions,  which  allows  creditors  to  seize  assets  of  a  troubled  firm.  There  may  be  many  
other  options,  depending  on  the  legal  system.  A  firm’s  choice  among  these  “distress  
options”  will  depend  on  internal  and  external  factors.  The  primary  internal  factor  is  
the  firm’s  capital  structure—that  is,  the  composition  of  its  debts  relative  to  its  assets.  
Some  options  are  better  suited  to  firms  with  complicated  capital  structures.  External  
factors  are  important  as  well.  Some  distress  options  are  more  expensive  than  others  
because   they  require  greater  court   involvement,  more  extensive  documentation,  or  
more  probing  investigation  by  creditors.  
                                                
†  Professor  of  Law,  Columbia  Law  School.  I  thank  participants  at  the  Second  ECFR  Symposium  
on  Corporate  Insolvency  (October  2007)  for  helpful  comments  and  Bryan  McArdle  for  research  
assistance.  
1  See  Edward  R.  Morrison,  “Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy:  Small  Business  Distress  and  State  
Law,”  working  paper  (2008)  [hereinafter  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy];  Edward  R.  
Morrison,  “Small  Business  Bankruptcy  and  the  Bankruptcy  Abuse  and  Consumer  Protection  
Act  of  2005,”  A  Report  to  the  United  States  Small  Business  Administration  (2007)  [hereinafter  
Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy];  Ronald  J.  Mann,  An  Empirical  Investigation  of  Liquidation  
Choices  of  Failed  High-­‐‑Tech  Firms,  82  Wash.  U.  L.  Q.  1375  (2004).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1151746 
 2 
A   nation’s   formal   bankruptcy   or   insolvency   code,   then,   is   only   one   part—
perhaps  a  small  part—of  the  overall  set  of  laws  governing  the  resolution  of  distress  
in  small  businesses.  This  observation  has  three  implications.    
First,  when  a  nation  reforms  its   insolvency  laws,  it  should  anticipate  several  
different  responses.  The  reform  will  undoubtedly  affect  the  administration  and  out-­‐‑
comes  of  cases  that  are  commenced  under  the  insolvency  law.  At  the  same  time,  the  
reform   will   alter   the   attractiveness   of   the   insolvency   law   relative   to   alternative  
modes  of  liquidation  and  reorganization.  If  reform  increases  the  costs  of  proceedings  
under  the  insolvency  laws,  businesses  and  their  creditors  will  find  it  more  attractive  
to  restructure  the  firm’s  indebtedness  voluntarily,  perhaps  through  a  “workout.”  Al-­‐‑
ternatively,  businesses  and  creditors  may  find  it  more  attractive  to  liquidate  or  auc-­‐‑
tion  off   the  business  using   the  ordinary  remedies  available   to  creditors—a  foreclo-­‐‑
sure,  or  a  lawsuit  followed  by  a  foreclosure.  As  businesses  and  their  creditors  gravi-­‐‑
tate  toward  these  alternative  distress  options,  the  effects  of  insolvency  reform  will  be  
dampened,  because   fewer  businesses  will  be  using   the   insolvency   laws.  And  there  
will   be   another   dampening   effect:   if   insolvency   laws   become   highly   unattractive,  
businesses  will   adjust   their   capital   structures   to   reduce   the   need   for   such   laws.  A  
business  with  only  a  handful  of  major  creditors  can  more  easily  reach  a  “workout”  
than  one  with  a  wide  range  of  creditors.  
This  complexity  points  to  a  second  implication:  insolvency  law  has  a  limited  
role   to  play   in   the  distress  of  small  businesses.   It  offers  a  mechanism  for  resolving  
distress  when  the  business  and  its  creditors  cannot  resolve  it  on  their  own.  But  in  a  
surprisingly  large  number  of  small  business  cases,  they  are  in  fact  able  to  resolve  it  
on  their  own.  Thus,  when  we  think  about  the  appropriate  design  of  insolvency  law,  
we  need   to  ask:  What  kinds  of   firms  need   this  kind  of   law?  My  research   suggests  
that  it  may  be  needed  by  relatively  large  firms  that  have  multiple  senior  lenders.  It  
may  also  be  needed  by  firms  that  have  lost  the  trust  of  their  creditors,  who  suspect  
that  the  owners  have  been  hiding  information.    
This  leads  to  a  final  implication:  empirical  research  is  essential  to  any  effort  to  
design  optimal  insolvency  law.  Once  we  identify  firms  that  need  insolvency  law,  we  
need  to  watch  their  behavior  when  these  laws  are  reformed.  If   insolvency  laws  be-­‐‑
come  too  costly  or  too  cumbersome,  these  firms  will  “vote  with  their  feet”  and  use  
alternatives,  even  if  the  alternatives  have  their  own  disadvantages.  By  watching  the  
behavior  of  firms,  we  can  determine  when  insolvency  reforms  work  well  and  when  
they  do  not.    
The  remainder  of  this  essay  will  present  a  series  of  figures,  drawn  from  prior  
work.  My  goal  is  to  establish  three  points:  (1)  federal  bankruptcy  filings  are  uncom-­‐‑
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mon  in   the  United  States,   (2)   the  attractiveness  of   the   federal  code  depends  on  the  
complexity  of  a  firm’s  capital  structure,   the  firm’s  relationship  with  senior   lenders,  
and  the  laws  governing  alternative  insolvency  procedures,  and  (3)  there  is  still  great  
uncertainty  surrounding  the  reasons  why  some  firms  do  and  most  do  not  use  feder-­‐‑
al  bankruptcy  law.  
II.  The  Rarity  of  Bankruptcy  Filings  
Figure   1   presents   the   central   observation   of   this   essay:   the   rarity   of   federal  
bankruptcy   filings   in   the  United   States.   This   figure   draws   on   small-­‐‑business   data  
collected   during   the   years   2004   and   2006   by   Dun   &   Bradstreet   (D&B),   a   credit-­‐‑
reporting  bureau.2  D&B  gathers  detailed  information  about  any  business  that  has  or  
may  soon  borrow  money  from  a  bank  or  trade  vendor.  Figure  1  shows  that  federal  
bankruptcy   filings   account   for   only   three   to   four   percent   of   all   business   closures.  
When  the  definition  of  “closure”  is  narrowed  to  include  only  businesses  that  closed  
at   a   point   in   time   when   they   were   financially   distressed,   the   percentage   rises   to  
around   twenty   percent   among   corporations   and   thirteen   percent   among   non-­‐‑
corporate  entities.    
<Figure  1  should  appear  here.>  
III.  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy:  Internal  and  External  Factors  
Why  are  bankruptcy  filings  rare  in  the  United  States?  Standard  texts  portray  
federal  bankruptcy  law  as  an  inevitable  choice  of  a  distressed  business.3  Once  it  be-­‐‑
comes  distressed,  the  business  faces  a  group  of  uncooperative  creditors,  each  of  
whom  is  rushing  to  be  the  first  to  bring  suit  and  foreclose  on  assets.  This  race  is  cost-­‐‑
ly  because  it  generates  duplicative  collection  efforts.  It  is  also  wasteful  because  these  
collection  efforts  could  lead  to  dismemberment  of  a  viable  firm.  Faced  with  a  de-­‐‑
structive  race  among  creditors,  the  distressed  business  will  invoke  the  protection  of  
the  Federal  Bankruptcy  Code,  which  stays  all  creditor  collection  efforts  and  gives  the  
business  time  to  sort  out  its  affairs  and  either  conduct  an  orderly  liquidation  or  reor-­‐‑
ganization.  Yet,  we  see  just  the  opposite  in  practice:  most  distressed  firms  never  file  
for  bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy  is  far  from  inevitable  –  it  is  exceptional.  Why?  This  sec-­‐‑
tion  proposes  several  theories  and  offers  evidence  consistent  with  each.  The  evi-­‐‑
dence  is  drawn  from  D&B  data  on  distressed  small  businesses  that  either  filed  a  fed-­‐‑
                                                
2  These  data  are  described  in  detail  in  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  18-­‐‑
23.  
3  See,  e.g.,  DOUGLAS  G.  BAIRD,  THOMAS  H.  JACKSON,  &  BARRY  E.  ADLER,  BANKRUPTCY:  CASES,  
PROBLEMS,  AND  MATERIALS  1-­‐‑3  (Foundation  Press  rev.  3d  ed.  2007);  THOMAS  H.  JACKSON,  THE  
LOGIC  AND  LIMITS  OF  BANKRUPTCY  LAW  7-­‐‑19  (Harvard  Univ.  Press  1986).  
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eral  bankruptcy  petition  (“bankruptcies”)  or  shut  down  without  filing  a  petition  
(“nonbankruptcy  closures”)  during  calendar  years  2004  and  2006.  With  one  excep-­‐‑
tion,  noted  in  subsection  C,  the  D&B  data  are  a  nationally  representative,  random  
sample  of  distressed  small  businesses.4  
A.  Capital  Structure  
Begin  first  with  the  uncontroversial  observation  that  bankruptcy  proceedings  
are  expensive.  Among  small  businesses  with  assets  worth  less  than  $1  million,5  the  
median  firm  incurs  professional  fees  and  other  direct  bankruptcy  costs  that  consume  
at  least  five  percent  of  asset  value.6  Among  businesses  with  assets  worth  less  than  
$100,000,  direct  costs  burn  twenty-­‐‑three  percent  of  asset  value.  The  costliness  of  fed-­‐‑
eral  bankruptcy  law  induces  distressed  firms  to  search  for  cheaper  alternatives.  In  
the  United  States  and  elsewhere,  there  are  many  alternatives.7  Some  are  contractu-­‐‑
al—the  firm  could  reach  a  consensual  workout  agreement  with  its  creditors.8  Some  
are  based  on  trust  law—the  firm  could  assign  its  assets  to  a  trustee,  who  would  then  
auction  them  and  distribute  the  proceeds  to  creditors.  In  the  United  States,  that  pro-­‐‑
cedure  is  called  an  “assignment  for  the  benefit  of  creditors.”  Other  procedures  are  
based  on  the  law  of  secured  transactions—the  firm  could  permit  a  secured  lender  to  
foreclose  on  assets.  This  is  called  a  “friendly  foreclosure.”  Whatever  the  legal  origin,  
there  are  many  alternatives  to  a  formal,  federal  bankruptcy  filing.  And  these  alterna-­‐‑
tives  may  be  cheaper  than  a  federal  filing.  
To  whom  will  they  be  cheaper?  They  will  often  be  cheaper  to  firms  with  sim-­‐‑
ple  capital  structures,   that   is,   firms  with  a  small  number  of   lenders,  each  of  whom  
holds   a   claim  with   well-­‐‑defined   priority.   The   smaller   the   number   of   lenders,   the  
lower  the  cost  of  coordination.  It  is  well  known  that  coordination  costs—and  the  risk  
that  a  creditor  will  hold  up  the  bargaining  process  in  order  to  extract  a  greater  pay-­‐‑
                                                
4  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  18-­‐‑23  (describing  the  process  by  which  
these  data  were  gathered).  
5  The  median  small  business,  in  or  out  of  bankruptcy,  is  actually  much  smaller,  with  assets  rang-­‐‑
ing  between  $100,000  and  $350,000.  See  Edward  R.  Morrison,  Bankruptcy  Decision  Making:  An  
Empirical  Study  of  Continuation  Bias  in  Small  Business  Bankruptcies,  50  J.  L.  &  Econ.  381,  386-­‐‑87  
(2007).  I  use  a  $1  million  cut-­‐‑off  because  it  is  also  used  by  Arturo  Bris,  Ivo  Welch,  &  Ning  Zhu,  
The  Costs  of  Bankruptcy:  Chapter  7  Liquidation  versus  Chapter  11  Reorganization,  61  J.  Fin.  1253,  1282  
(2006).  
6  See  Bris,  et  al.,  supra  note  5,  at  1282.  
7  For  a  convenient,  brief  summary  of  these  alternatives,  see  James  A.  Chatz  &  Joy  E.  Levy,  Alter-­‐‑
natives  to  Bankruptcy,  17  J.  Bankr.  L.  &  Prac.  5  (2008).  
8  Workouts  and  other  alternatives  discussed  here  are  described  in  detail  in  Morrison,  Bargaining  
Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1.  
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off—tend  to  fall  as  the  number  of  creditors  shrinks  in  size.9  Coordination  is  essential  
because,  unlike  a  federal  bankruptcy  case,  a  business  generally  cannot  invoke  state-­‐‑
law  procedures  to  halt  creditors  from  pursuing  collection  efforts.  There   is,   in  other  
words,  no  “automatic  stay”  outside  federal  bankruptcy  court.  
But  it  is  unnecessary  for  the  total  number  of  creditors  to  be  small.10  All  that  is  
necessary  is  that  the  number  of  senior  lenders  be  relatively  small.  By  senior,  I  mean  
creditors   with   security   interests   or   large   unsecured   claims.   These   creditors   have  
large  relatively  large  claims  and,  therefore,  large  incentives  to  monitor  the  firm  and  
demand   a   payout   from   any   procedure   that   resolves   the   distress.   These   creditors  
should   be   contrasted  with   junior   creditors,   such   as   trade   vendors,  who   have   such  
small  claims  that  they  will  rarely  if  ever  monitor  the  debtor  or  participate  in  an  in-­‐‑
solvency  proceeding.  Because   they  are   silent  participants   and  because   their   claims  
are  small,  junior  creditors  are  often  ignored  when  a  firm  takes  steps  to  resolve  its  fi-­‐‑
nancial  distress.    
To  be  sure,  junior  creditors  can  disrupt  efforts  to  resolve  distress  in  or  outside  
federal   bankruptcy   court.   But   they   rarely   do   so.   Even   if   they   do,   dissent   can   be  
quelled.  A  relatively  small  payment  may  convince  junior  creditors  that  they  should  
not   object   to   whatever   procedure   the   firm   and   its   senior   creditors   have   chosen.11  
Additionally,  there  are  procedures  under  state  laws—such  as  an  assignment  for  the  
benefit   of   creditors12—which   can   be   implemented   without   any   consent   from   or  
payment  to  junior  creditors.  
<Figures  2  and  3  about  here.>  
This  theory  finds  strong  support  in  the  D&B  data,  as  Figures  2  and  3  show.  In  
these  and  the  remaining  figures,  solid  black  bars  measure  the  characteristics  of  firms  
that   filed   federal   bankruptcy   petitions   (“bankruptcies”);  white   bars  measure   busi-­‐‑
nesses   that   closed  without   filing   for   bankruptcy   (“closures”).   If   the   difference   be-­‐‑
tween  bankruptcies  and  closures   is  statistically  significant  at   the  five  percent   level,  
the  bar  for  “closures”  is  cross-­‐‑hatched  instead  of  solid  white.  Here,  and  throughout  
this  essay,  patterns  that  are  statistically  significant  in  the  figures  are  also  statistically  
                                                
9  See,  e.g.,  MANCUR  OLSON,  THE  LOGIC  OF  COLLECTIVE  ACTION  44-­‐‑45  (1965);  George  J.  Stigler,  
Free  Riders  and  Collective  Action:  An  Appendix  to  Theories  of  Economic  Regulation,  5  Bell  J.  Econ.  &  
Mgmt.  359,  360-­‐‑62  (1974).  
10  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  10-­‐‑12.  
11  This  observation  is  based  on  interviews  with  anonymous  Illinois  attorneys.  
12  See  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  10-­‐‑12.  
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significant   in  multivariate   logit  models,  details  of  which  can  be   found   in  my  other  
work.13  
Recall   that  corporations  are   twice  as   likely   to   file  a   federal  bankruptcy  peti-­‐‑
tion   as   non-­‐‑corporate   entities.   Figure   2   shows   that   corporations   also   have   signifi-­‐‑
cantly  more  complicated  capital   structures   than  non-­‐‑corporate  entities.  Even  when  
we  focus  exclusively  on  corporations,  as  Figure  3  does,  we  see  that  corporations  that  
file  for  bankruptcy  have  more  complicated  capital  structures  than  those  that  use  al-­‐‑
ternative  procedures.  We  would  see  exactly  the  same  pattern  if  we  focused  on  non-­‐‑
corporate  entities:   firms   in  bankruptcy  have  significantly  more  complicated  capital  
structures.   These   observations   are   consistent   with   the   hypothesis   that   distressed  
businesses  turn  to  federal  bankruptcy  law  when  they  face  a  large  number  of  senior  
lenders,  each  of  whom  can  hold  up  alternative  procedures  under  state  law.  
B.  Firm  Size  
Another   important   factor   is   firm   size.   The   larger   the   firm,   as   measured   in  
terms  of  assets,  the  greater  the  potential  distribution  to  creditors,  especially  lenders  
with   secured  claims.14  A  secured   lender  with  a   claim  equal   to,   say,   $1  million  will  
have  stronger  incentive  to  monitor  and  bring  suit  against  a  large  firm  than  a  small  
one.  In  some  respects,  the  point  here  is  similar  to  the  one  made  about  capital  struc-­‐‑
ture  complexity:  the  larger  the  firm,  the  more  likely  it  will  face  aggressive  creditors  
and  be  unable  to  reach  agreement  without  filing  a  federal  bankruptcy  case.  Indeed,  
larger  firms  tend  to  have  more  complicated  capital  structures.    
<Figures  4  and  5  about  here.>  
This  theory—that   larger  firms  are  more  likely  to  use  federal   law—also  finds  
support  in  the  data.  Recall  from  Figure  1  that  corporations  are  more  likely  to  invoke  
federal  law  than  their  non-­‐‑corporate  counterparts.  Figure  4  shows  that  corporations  
are  older,  have  greater  annual  sales,  more  lines  of  business  (as  measured  by  Stand-­‐‑
ard   Industrial  Classification   (SIC)   codes),   and  more  employees   than  non-­‐‑corporate  
entities.  Each  of   these  variables   is  a  direct  or   indirect  measure  of   firm  size,  and  all  
indicate   that   corporations   are   much   larger   than   their   non-­‐‑corporate   counterparts.  
Figure  5  digs  deeper,  comparing  bankruptcies  to  closures.  The  same  pattern  emerg-­‐‑
es:   among   corporations   as  well   as   non-­‐‑corporate   entities,   firms   in   bankruptcy   are  
significantly  larger  than  those  that  resolve  distress  using  alternative  state-­‐‑law  proce-­‐‑
dures.    
                                                
13  Id.;  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1.  
14  This  argument  is  developed  in  greater  detail  in  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  
note  1,  at  13.  
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C.  Relationships  with  Creditors  
Even  if  a  firm  has  a  simple  capital  structure,  it  may  still  find  federal  law  at-­‐‑
tractive.  A  workout  or  other  non-­‐‑bankruptcy  procedure  will  not  succeed  unless  sen-­‐‑
ior  lenders  trust  the  firm’s  disclosures  or  can  verify  them  at  reasonable  cost.  These  
disclosures  include  information  abut  the  value  of  the  firm’s  assets,  the  reasons  for  its  
financial  troubles,  and  its  prospects  for  recovery.  There  is  little  use  in  permitting  a  
small  business  to  reorganize  if  it  is  destined  to  fail  again,  or  if  the  owner  is  stealing  
from  the  firm.  If  lenders  worry  about  these  things,  they  can  audit  the  firm.  But  au-­‐‑
dits  are  costly  and,  if  multiple  creditors  demand  independent  audits,  the  debtor  may  
prefer  to  file  a  federal  bankruptcy  petition.  When  creditors  pursue  their  own  audits,  
non-­‐‑bankruptcy  procedures  may  become  just  as  cumbersome  and  costly  as  a  federal  
bankruptcy  case.15  
It  is  difficult,  of  course,  to  know  precisely  when  a  creditor  mistrusts  a  firm’s  
owner.  There  are,  however,  proxies.  One  is  whether  the  firm  has  defaulted  on  senior  
debt  or  been  habitually   late   in  payments.  This  kind  of  behavior  damages   the  busi-­‐‑
ness’s  relationship  with  the  senior  lender,  which  may  lead  the  bank  or  another  sen-­‐‑
ior   lender   to   be   more   skeptical   about   the   owner-­‐‑manager’s   reports.16   Using   this  
measure  as  a  proxy  for  creditor  mistrust,  the  data  show  that  mistrust  is  much  more  
prevalent  among  firms  in  bankruptcy  than  among  those  that  invoke  state-­‐‑law  alter-­‐‑
natives.  Figures  2  and  3  show  that  firms  in  bankruptcy  are  much  more  likely  to  be  
late   or   have   defaulted   on   large   trade   debts,   which   are   defined   as   large   liabilities  
owed  to  suppliers  of  goods  or  services.17    
Similarly,  Figure  6  shows  that,  among  small  corporations,  firms  in  bankrupt-­‐‑
cy  are  significantly  more  likely  to  have  defaulted  on  secured  debt.  The  data  underly-­‐‑
ing  this  figure  differs  from  those  underlying  the  other  figures  in  this  essay.  Figure  6  
summarizes   the   characteristics   of   small   corporations   that   were   located   in   Cook  
                                                
15  This  argument  is  developed  in  detail  by  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  
1,  at  16-­‐‑19,  41-­‐‑44.  
16  A  large  literature  documents  the  importance  of  “relationship-­‐‑based  lending”  among  small  
businesses.  See,  e.g.,  Allen  N.  Berger  &  Gregory  F.  Udell,  Relationship  Lending  and  Lines  of  Credit  
in  Small  Firm  Finance,  68  J.  Bus.  351  (1995);  Mitchell  A.  Petersen  &  Raghuram  G.  Rajan,  The  Bene-­‐‑
fits  of  Firm-­‐‑Creditor  Relationships:  Evidence  from  Small  Business  Data,  49  J.  Fin.  3  (1994).  
17  This  definition  may  seem  counter-­‐‑intuitive.  For  the  typical  firm,  most  trade  debts  are  small  
(perhaps  $100)  liabilities  owed  to  suppliers.  D&B,  however,  records  information  about  trade  
debts  only  when  a  creditor  reports  information  to  the  credit  bureau.  Creditors  report  this  infor-­‐‑
mation  only  when  they  have  relatively  large  claims  against  the  firm.  For  this  reason,  when  D&B  
reports  that  a  business  is  late  in  paying  or  has  defaulted  on  trade  debt,  I  assume  that  the  busi-­‐‑
ness  is  late  in  paying  or  has  defaulted  on  large  trade  debts.  
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County,   Illinois,   suffered  distress   between   1998   and   2000,   and   then   filed   a   federal  
bankruptcy  petition  or  shut  down  without  filing  a  petition  before  2005.18  These  geo-­‐‑
graphic  and  temporal  limitations  were  necessary  because  comparable  information—
about   defaults   on   secured   debt—was   unavailable   in   the   nationally-­‐‑representative  
sample  used  in  the  rest  of  this  essay.  
<Figure  6  about  here.>  
I  view  these  patterns  as  evidence   that   firms   in  bankruptcy  have  worse   rela-­‐‑
tionships  with  their  creditors  than  firms  that  invoke  state-­‐‑law  alternatives.  There  is  
an  alternative  interpretation,  of  course:  firms  in  bankruptcy  are  more  distressed  (as  
evidenced  by  the  relatively  large  number  of  defaults)  than  firms  using  state-­‐‑law  al-­‐‑
ternatives.  Although  I  cannot  rule  out  this  interpretation,  I  do  not  think  it  is  a  com-­‐‑
plete  explanation  of   the  patterns   in  Figures  2,  3,  and  6.  These   figures  compare  dis-­‐‑
tressed  businesses  that  filed  for  bankruptcy  to  distressed  businesses  that  resolved  dis-­‐‑
tress  using  alternative  procedures.  Distress  was  measured  using  D&B’s  proprietary  
“financial   stress   score.”19  Assuming   this   scoring   system   is   an   accurate  measure   of  
financial  distress,  Figures  2,  3,  and  6  are  comparing  two  groups  of  firms  that  are,  on  
average,   equally  distressed.  Though   they  are  equally  distressed,  one  group—firms  
in   bankruptcy—are   significantly  more   likely   to   have   defaulted   on   or   been   late   in  
paying  secured  debts  and  large  trade  debts.  This,  I  believe,  is  evidence  that  creditor-­‐‑
debtor  relationships  are  worse  among  firms  in  bankruptcy.  
D.  Non-­‐‑Bankruptcy  Law  
The  level  of  trust  between  a  business  and  its  senior  lenders  may  depend  on  
the  law.  In  particular,  laws  governing  non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives  may  affect  a  
creditor’s  willingness  to  consent  to  these  alternatives.  These  laws  vary  significantly  
across  the  fifty  states.20  Some  states,  such  as  Florida,  New  York,  and  Texas,  have  
adopted  fairly  comprehensive  regulations  that  give  courts  authority  to  oversee  in-­‐‑
solvency  proceedings  and  give  creditors  rights  to  sue  insiders  or  other  creditors  who  
were  singled  out  for  favorable  treatment  by  the  business  while  it  sank  into  distress.  
Other  states  give  businesses  a  much  freer  hand  in  resolving  distress.  In  states  such  as  
Connecticut,  Illinois,  Nevada,  and  Oregon,  no  statute  regulates  the  process.  It  is  in-­‐‑
stead  governed  by  common  law,  which  imposes  relatively  few  burdens  on  insolvent  
                                                
18  These  data  are  described  in  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  .  
19  See  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  23.  
20  For  detailed  discussion  of  these  laws,  see  id.,  at  17-­‐‑20.  
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debtors.  Courts  are  not  directly  involved  in  the  insolvency  process;  creditors  have  
limited  power  to  bring  suit  against  favored  insiders  or  other  creditors.21  
Variation  in  state  law—greater  regulation  in  some  states  than  others—will  af-­‐‑
fect  a  distressed  firm’s  choice  between  federal  bankruptcy  law  and  state-­‐‑law  alterna-­‐‑
tives.   First,   state-­‐‑law   alternatives   will   be  more   expensive   in   states   with   relatively  
rigorous   regulation.  Court   fees   and   other   legal   costs,   for   example,  will   be   paid   in  
states  with   judicial   oversight.   If   these   costs   exceed   the   expense   of   a   federal   bank-­‐‑
ruptcy  filing,  a  distressed  small  business  will   invoke  federal   law.  Thus,  small  busi-­‐‑
nesses  may  be  more  likely  to  file  federal  bankruptcy  petitions  in  states  with  vigorous  
regulation.  
Vigorous   regulation   could,   however,   have   the   opposite   effect.   Suppose   the  
costs  of  vigorous  regulation  are  less  than  the  expense  of  a  federal  bankruptcy  case,  
as   they  are  generally   thought   to  be.22  These  regulations  may  be  attractive   to  senior  
lenders,  because  they  give  the  lenders  broad  power  to  audit  the  distressed  business  
and  attack  various   forms  of   self-­‐‑dealing.23   Suppose,   for   example,   that   the  business  
repaid  loans  from  insiders,  to  the  disadvantage  of  third-­‐‑party  creditors,  while  it  was  
distressed.   If   the  business  has   filed  a   federal  bankruptcy  petition,   creditors  can  re-­‐‑
cover   these   “preferential   transfers”   from   the   insiders.24   If   the   business   is   pursuing  
non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives,  creditors  can  recover   the  “preferential   transfers”  only  
if  the  state  has  adopted  section  5(b)  of  the  Uniform  Fraudulent  Transfer  Act.25  As  of  
                                                
21  These  interstate  differences  are  discussed  and  summarized  in  tabular  form  in  id.,  at  10-­‐‑14,  16-­‐‑
19,  and  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  14-­‐‑16.  
22  See,  e.g.,  Malanie  Rovner  Cohen  &  Joanna  L.  Challacombe,  Assignment  for  the  Benefit  of  Credi-­‐‑
tors—Contemporary  Alternatives  for  Corporations,  2  DePaul  Bus.  L.  J.  269,  270  (1990)  (“In  contrast  
to  a  Chapter  7  liquidation  under  the  Bankruptcy  Code,  an  assignment  is  generally  more  effi-­‐‑
cient,  less  costly,  of  shorter  duration,  more  successful  in  terms  of  the  value  received  for  the  assts  
and  amounts  paid  to  creditors  and  more  tailored  to  the  needs  of  debtors  and  their  creditors.”);  
David  S.  Kupetz,  Assignment  for  the  Benefit  of  Creditors:  Advantageous  Vehicle  for  Selling  and  Ac-­‐‑
quiring  Distressed  Enterprises,  6  J.  Private  Equity  16,  18  (2003)  (same);  Ronald  J.  Mann,  An  Empiri-­‐‑
cal  Investigation  of  Liquidation  Choices  of  Failed  High-­‐‑Tech  Firms,  82  Wash.  U.  L.  Q.  1375,  1392-­‐‑93  
(2004)  (same);  Bruce  C.  Scalambrino,  Representing  a  Creditor  in  an  Assignment  for  the  Benefit  of  
Creditors,  92  Ill.  Bar  J.  263  (2004)  (same).  
23  See  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  16-­‐‑19.  
24  11  U.S.C.  §  547(b).  
25  Unif.  Fraud.  Transfer  Act  §  5(b),  7A  U.L.A.  129  (2006)  (“A  transfer  made  by  a  debtor  is  fraudu-­‐‑
lent  as  to  a  creditor  whose  claim  arose  before  the  transfer  was  made  if  the  transfer  was  made  to  
an  insider  for  an  antecedent  debt,  the  debtor  was  insolvent  at  that  time,  and  the  insider  had  rea-­‐‑
sonable  cause  to  believe  that  the  debtor  was  insolvent.”).  
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this  writing,  it  has  been  adopted  in  thirty-­‐‑nine  states  and  the  District  of  Columbia.26  
In   these  states,   then,   lenders  have  relatively  strong  power  to  audit  distressed  busi-­‐‑
nesses  and  unwind  self-­‐‑dealing  by  insiders.  If  this  power  is  valuable  to  senior  lend-­‐‑
ers,  they  will  be  more  likely  to  permit  a  business  to  use  non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives  
in  states  that  have  adopted  section  5(b)  than  in  those  that  have  not  adopted  it.  Fed-­‐‑
eral  bankruptcy  law,  then,  could  be  less  popular  in  states  that  heavily  regulate  their  
non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives  –  just  the  opposite  effect  from  the  one  predicted  in  the  
preceding  paragraph.  
There   is   mixed   evidence   suggesting   that   state   regulations   do   in   fact   make  
non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives  more  attractive.  In  related  work,  I  compare  states  with  
high  and   low  bankruptcy   filing  rates,  which  I  define  as   the  number  of  bankruptcy  
filings  for  every  hundred  failed  businesses.  I  find  that  filing  rates  are  lower  in  states  
with   strict   regulations.27   This   is   consistent  with   the   hypothesis   that   creditors   (and  
debtors)   are  more   likely   to   use   a   state’s   insolvency   procedures,   instead   of   federal  
bankruptcy  law,  when  the  laws  of  that  state  promote  transparency  in  the  insolvency  
procedures.    
The  pattern,  however,  is  tentative.  In  two  separate  papers,  I  explore  the  pat-­‐‑
tern   carefully   using   statistical   methods.   In   one,   I   use   a   nationally   representative  
sample   of   distressed   small   businesses,   drawn   from  D&B  data.28   I   test  whether   the  
terms   of   state   law   affect   a   business’s   choice   between   federal   bankruptcy   law   and  
state  insolvency  procedures.  There  appears  to  be  no  effect:  among  both  corporations  
and   non-­‐‑corporations,   a   distressed   small   business   is   no   more   likely   to   use   non-­‐‑
bankruptcy  procedures   in   states  with   comprehensive   regulations   (e.g.,  New  York)  
than  in  states  with  relatively  lax  regulations  (e.g.,  Illinois).    
The   analysis   in   that   paper,   however,   does   not   distinguish   distressed   firms  
seeking  to  reorganize  from  those  planning  to  liquidate.  State  laws  may  matter  more  
for  reorganizing  firms  than  for   those   that  are   liquidating.  Reorganizing  firms  need  
creditor  cooperation,  and  a  creditor’s  willingness  to  cooperate  may  depend  on  exist-­‐‑
ing  law.  If  state  law  offers  a  transparent  insolvency  procedure—which  helps  credi-­‐‑
tors   assess   whether   insiders   behaved   badly   and  whether   the   firm’s   prospects   are  
good—creditors  may  cooperate  with  a  debtor  seeking  to  reorganize  via  state   insol-­‐‑
                                                
26  Forty-­‐‑four  states  have  adopted  the  UFTA  in  whole  or  in  part.  These  states  are  listed  at  
<http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-­‐‑fs-­‐‑ufta.asp>.  In  Morrison,  
Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  60-­‐‑61,  I  identify  the  subset  of  states  that  have  
adopted  section  5(b).  
27  See  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  36-­‐‑37.  
28  Morrison,  Bargaining  around  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  31-­‐‑36.  
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vency  procedures.  Otherwise,  creditors  may  refuse  to  cooperate  unless  the  firm  files  
a  federal  bankruptcy  petition.  
I  test  this  hypothesis  in  a  separate  paper,  which  uses  annual  data  on  (i)  busi-­‐‑
ness  bankruptcy  filings  by  state  and  chapter  (Chapter  11  versus  Chapter  7)  and  (ii)  
total  business   failures  by  state.29  These  data  are  published  by   the  U.S.   federal  gov-­‐‑
ernment.   I   find   that   Federal  Chapter   11   filings   (generally  used   for   reorganization)  
are  less  common  in  states  with  broad  laws  regulating  payments  to  insiders.30  Filings  
under  Chapter  7  (used  for  liquidation)  are  uncorrelated  with  state  law.  This  suggests  
that  state  laws  do  matter  when  a  firm  is  reorganizing,  but  not  when  it  is  liquidating.    
E.  Other  Factors:  Remaining  Uncertainty  
Other  factors  may  affect  a  firm’s  choice  between  federal  bankruptcy  law  and  
state  alternatives.  Gender,  race,  and  ethnicity,  for  example,  appear  to  matter,  as  Fig-­‐‑
ure   7   shows.   Among   proprietorships   and   partnerships,   female-­‐‑owned   firms   are  
more  likely  to  avoid  federal  bankruptcy  law  than  male-­‐‑owned  firms.  The  same  effect  
is  observed  among  minority-­‐‑owned  firms,  although  the  difference  between  minori-­‐‑
ty-­‐‑owned  and  non-­‐‑minority-­‐‑owned  firms  is  not  statistically  significant.  Just  the  op-­‐‑
posite  pattern  is  observed  among  corporations.  Female-­‐‑owned  and  minority-­‐‑owned  
businesses   are   more   likely   to   use   federal   law   than   their   male-­‐‑owned   and   non-­‐‑
minority-­‐‑owned  counterparts.    
<Figure  7  about  here.>  
These  patterns  could  reflect  discrimination  in  credit  markets.  Discrimination  
against  minority  entrepreneurs  is  well-­‐‑documented31  and  could  make  federal  bankrupt-­‐‑
cy  law  more  attractive  than  state-­‐‑law  alternatives,  because  it  offers  a  court-­‐‑supervised  
opportunity  to  bargain  with  discriminatory  creditors.  This  may  explain  why  minority-­‐‑
owned  corporations  are  more  likely  to  invoke  federal  law  than  non-­‐‑minority-­‐‑owned  
businesses.  On  the  other  hand,  minority-­‐‑  or  woman-­‐‑owned  firms  may  be  relatively  
small,  due  to  credit-­‐‑market  discrimination  that  prevents  these  firms  from  exploiting  
                                                
29  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  44-­‐‑49.  
30  All  states  regulate  fraudulent  payments  to  insiders,  but  only  some  regulate  non-­‐‑fraudulent  
payments  to  insiders  on  account  of  antecedent  debt  (i.e.,  the  insider  previously  loaned  money  to  
the  debtor  business).  The  latter  states  have  adopted  Uniform  Fraudulent  Transfer  Act  §5(b),  
which  permits  a  creditor  or  trustee  to  recover  these  payments,  if  they  were  made  while  the  
debtor  was  insolvent.  This  provision  is  discussed  in  Morrison,  Bargaining  Around  Bankruptcy,  
supra  note  1,  at  20.  
31  David  G.  Blanchflower,  Phillip  B.  Levine,  &  David  J.  Zimmerman,  Discrimination  in  the  Small-­‐‑
Business  Credit  Market,  85  Rev.  Econ.  &  Stat.  930  (2003).  
 12 
growth  opportunities.  Due  to  their  small  size  and  limited  resources,  these  firms  may  be  
deterred  by  the  relatively  high  cost  of  a  federal  bankruptcy  case.  This  might  explain  
why  minority-­‐‑owned  proprietorships  and  partnerships—which  are  much  small  than  
corporations,  as  Figure  2  shoed—are  less  likely  to  use  federal  law  than  their  non-­‐‑
minority-­‐‑owned  counterparts.32  
But  it  seems  premature  to  view  the  patterns  in  Figure  7  as  evidence  of  discrimi-­‐‑
nation.  Recent  empirical  work  finds  no  evidence  of  credit  market  discrimination  against  
female  entrepreneurs,33  yet  Figure  7  shows  that  the  same  patterns  characterize  both  mi-­‐‑
nority-­‐‑owned  and  female-­‐‑owned  firms.  These  patterns  may  only  highlight  the  remain-­‐‑
ing  uncertainty  surrounding  the  reasons  why  some  businesses  find  federal  bankruptcy  
law  attractive,  but  most  do  not.  
Additional   evidence   of   this   uncertainty   comes   from   regression   models   in  
which  I  predict  the  likelihood  that  a  business  will  file  a  federal  bankruptcy  petition.34  
I  account  for  all  of  the  factors  listed  in  this  essay,  and  many  more.  The  models,  un-­‐‑
fortunately,  do  a  fairly  mediocre  job  in  predicting  whether  a  given  firm  will  file  for  
bankruptcy.   Among   firms   that   actually   did   file   a   federal   bankruptcy   petition,   the  
models  estimate  a  probability  of  filing  equal  to  only  twenty-­‐‑six  percent.  This  tells  us  
that,  despite  the  importance  of  the  various  factors  discussed  above,  there  are  many  
other  factors  that  affect  a  firm’s  choice  between  the  U.S.  Bankruptcy  Code  and  state  
alternatives.    
III.  Conclusion  
This  sobering  observation  should  not  detract  from  the  valuable  information  
contained  in  Figures  1  through  7.  They  point  to  an  important  balance  in  the  design  
of  bankruptcy  law.  In  any  legal  system,  there  will  be  multiple  ways  to  resolve  dis-­‐‑
tress,  ranging  from  a  collective  “workout”  among  creditors  to  a  formal  bankruptcy  
                                                
32  Dawsey  and  Ausubel  find  a  similar  pattern  in  their  study  of  distressed  consumers,  who  can  
discharge  debt  by  filing  a  federal  bankruptcy  filing  or  by  forcing  creditors  to  pursue  collection  
under  state  law.  See  Amanda  E.  Dawsey  &  Lawrence  M.  Ausubel,  “Informal  Bankruptcy,”  
SSRN  working  paper  (Feb.  2002).  Because  many  creditors  will  “charge  off”  a  debt  instead  of  
pursuing  collection,  Dawsey  and  Ausubel  argue  that  distressed  consumers  face  a  choice  be-­‐‑
tween  “formal  bankruptcy”  (a  federal  filing)  and  “informal  bankruptcy”  (placing  the  burden  on  
creditors  to  assert  state  law  remedies).  The  authors  find  that  members  of  minority  groups  are  
more  likely  than  other  borrowers  to  choose  “informal  bankruptcy.”  The  authors  do  not,  howev-­‐‑
er,  offer  a  theory  that  might  explain  this  pattern.    
33  Arne  L.  Kalleberg  &  Kevin  T.  Leicht,  Gender  and  Organization  Performance:  Determinants  of  
Small  Business  Survival  and  Success,  34  Acad.  Mgmt.  J.  136  (1991).  
34  Morrison,  Small  Business  Bankruptcy,  supra  note  1,  at  44-­‐‑49  
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proceeding.  Distressed  firms  will  choose  the  procedure  that  offers  the  greatest  re-­‐‑
turn  (to  the  owner  and  creditors)  at  lowest  cost.  This  choice  will  be  driven  by  inter-­‐‑
nal  factors,  such  as  the  firm’s  capital  structure,  as  well  as  external  ones,  such  as  for-­‐‑
mal  differences  between  bankruptcy  law  and  non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives.  As  gov-­‐‑
ernments  vary  the  design  of  bankruptcy  laws,  they  should  be  sensitive  to  the  deci-­‐‑
sion-­‐‑making  of  distressed  businesses.  Any  reform  in  bankruptcy  law  will  have  two  
effects.  It  will  alter  outcomes  among  businesses  that  invoke  the  bankruptcy  process.  
It  will  also  alter  the  attractiveness  of  the  bankruptcy  process  relative  to  its  alterna-­‐‑
tives.  For  example,  bankruptcy-­‐‑law  reforms  that  expand  protections  for  unsecured  
creditors,  such  as  suppliers  of  raw  materials,  may  only  increase  the  incentive  of  
debtors  and  secured  creditors  to  pursue  non-­‐‑bankruptcy  alternatives.  
Of  course,  a  firm’s  decision-­‐‑making  process—its  choice  between  bankruptcy  
law  and  alternatives—will  depend  on  the  range  of  available  alternatives.  In  the  
United  States,  the  range  is  fairly  broad.  In  other  countries,  it  may  be  narrower.  The  
findings  in  this  paper  point  to  an  important  benefit  from  a  broad  range  of  bankrupt-­‐‑
cy  alternatives:  the  broader  the  range,  the  better  the  fit  between  (i)  the  financial  
problems  facing  a  particular  firm  and  (ii)  the  legal  mechanism  for  resolving  those  
problems.  In  the  United  States,  we  see  firms  sort  themselves  across  legal  mecha-­‐‑
nisms.  Firms  with  simple  capital  structures  use  relatively  simple  state-­‐‑law  devices;  
larger,  more  complex  firms  invoke  the  relatively  complex  Bankruptcy  Code.      
A  tough  question  remains,  however.  It  is  one  thing  to  say  that  a  broad  range  
of  legal  options  is  a  good  idea,  but  it  is  quite  another  thing  to  say  that  a  national  in-­‐‑
solvency  code  needs  to  be  one  of  those  options.  Although  we  do  see  larger,  more  
complicated  firms  choosing  federal  law  in  the  United  States,  we  do  not  know  
whether  these  firms  actually  need  federal  law  to  solve  their  problems.  State-­‐‑law  al-­‐‑
ternatives  may  be  perfectly  adequate.35  Federal  law  may  be  chosen  only  when  the  
debtor  or  its  owners  behaved  badly  or  were  overly  aggressive  in  bargaining  with  
creditors.  The  bankruptcy  filing  may  only  reflect  an  effort  to  delay  creditor  collection  
efforts.  Federal  law,  in  other  words,  may  give  the  owners  of  firms  too  much  bargain-­‐‑
ing  power  in  times  of  distress.36    
                                                
35  We  could,  therefore,  consider  reforms  that  give  the  states  greater  authority  to  regulate  the  
bankruptcy  of  small  businesses  in  the  United  States.  Such  reforms  are  explored  in  id.,  at  59-­‐‑60,  
and  David  A.  Skeel,  Jr.,  Rethinking  the  Line  Between  Corporate  Law  and  Corporate  Bankruptcy,  72  
Tex.  L.  Rev.  471,  545-­‐‑52  (1994).  
36  Among  small  businesses,  this  may  be  the  primary  effect  of  Chapter  11.  See  Douglas  G.  Baird  &  
Edward  R.  Morrison,  Serial  Entrepreneurs  and  Small  Business  Bankruptcies,  105  Colum.  L.  Rev.  
2310  (2005).  
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Then  again,  non-­‐‑bankruptcy  procedures  may  be  incapable  of  dealing  with  
particular  kinds  of  problems  facing  distressed  firms,  such  as  fraud  committed  by  in-­‐‑
siders  or  the  difficulty  of  reorganizing  a  business  with  operations  in  many  different  
states  and  countries.  It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  large,  publicly-­‐‑traded  corporations  
need  a  formal  insolvency  code  for  just  these  reasons.  But  it  is  less  clear  that  a  code  is  
needed  for  smaller  businesses.  If  anything,  this  discussion  points  to  the  value  of  ad-­‐‑
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Figure  1.    Federal  Bankruptcy  Filings  Expressed  as  a  Percentage  of    



























































































Figure  2:  Capital  Structure  of  Corporations  and  Non-­‐‑Corporate  Entities  that  Closed  or  Filed  





























































































Figure  3.  Capital  Structure  of  Corporations  that  Closed  or  Filed  a  Bankruptcy  Petition  during  





















Figure  4.  Proxies  for  Firm  Size  among  Corporations  and  Non-­‐‑Corporate  Entities  that  Closed  or  























































































Figure  5.  Proxies  for  Firm  Size  among  Corporations  that  Closed  or  Filed  a  Bankruptcy  Petition  dur-­‐‑
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Figure  6.  Proxies  for  the  Quality  of  Lender-­‐‑Borrow  Relations  among  Chicago-­‐‑Area  Corporations  
that  Closed  or  Filed  a  Bankruptcy  Petition  between  1998  and  2005.  Each  bar  indicates  the  













Figure  7.  Other  Characteristics  of  Corporations  and  Non-­‐‑Corporate  Entities.  Each  bar  indicates  the  per-­‐‑
centage  of  firms  with  a  particular  characteristic.  
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